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ON THE OPTIMALITY OF DIVERSE EXPERT PANELS IN
PERSUASION GAMES
SOURAV BHATTACHARYAy, MARIA GOLTSMANz, AND ARIJIT MUKHERJEEx
Abstract. We consider a persuasion game where the decision-maker relies on a
panel of biased experts. An experts preference is parameterized by his ideal action,
or agenda. Common intuition suggests that more information is revealed if the panel
includes experts with opposed agendas, because such experts will undo each others
attempts to conceal unfavorable information. In contrast, we show that recruiting
experts with diverse agendas is optimal only if the correlation between the experts
types i.e., whether they are informed or not is above a threshold. Moreover, if the
expertstypes are independent, under mild assumptions it is optimal to recruit experts
who have extreme but identical agendas. These ndings suggest that the diversity
of preferences must be considered in conjunction with the diversity of information
sources, and it is generally sub-optimal to seek diversity in both dimensions.
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1. Introduction
Decision-makers often rely on experts for information. However, the experts them-
selves may have preferences over the decision and strategically manipulate their advice.
For example, suppose that the government is contemplating a policy for environmental
regulation and seeks advice from a panel of experts on how stringent the regulation
needs to be. An expert may be pro-industry and prefer to remove the regulation alto-
gether, or pro-environment and prefer to have the most stringent regulation feasible.
The ideological leanings of the potential members may be publicly known from their
past records of public service and/or institutional a¢ liation. A natural question to ask
in such an environment is the following: if the decision-maker could compose the panel
by selecting experts with specic preferences, which experts should she choose? Should
the panel consist of experts of conicting ideological leanings, or of experts who share
the same ideology?
Common intuition suggests that a panel of experts with opposed preferences is more
conducive to information revelation (see, e.g., Milgrom, 2008; Sward, 1989). The
perceived benet of such a panel is that the competing experts may undo each others
attempts to conceal unfavorable information. The literature on persuasion games has
also primarily focused on the settings where the preferences of the informed parties
are opposed in some sense (notable examples include Milgrom and Roberts, 1986;
Lipman and Seppi, 1995; Shin, 1994, 1998; Glazer and Rubinstein, 2001; and Chen
and Olszewski, 2014).
In this article, we argue that the above intuition favoring diversity may be misleading
and the question of optimal panel design is considerably more nuanced. We compare a
panel composed of experts with opposite preferences (which we call the diverse panel)
with one where experts have identical preferences (the homogeneous panel), allowing
for correlation in expert types, i.e., whether or not the experts possess the decision-
relevant information. Our main result is that the diverse panel is optimal when such
correlation is high and a homogeneous panel is optimal when the correlation is low.
In particular, when expert types are independent, a homogeneous panel outperforms
the diverse panel in a broad range of environments, including ones that are commonly
assumed in the literature.
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Notice that correlation in expert types may arise from the similarity in information
sources accessed by the experts or similarity in methodology used in analyzing the
available data. Thus, our result indicates that it is important to distinguish between
two kinds of diversity among the experts diversity in their preferences and diversity
in their information sources and it is typically sub-optimal to seek diversity in both
dimensions.
In a related article, Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013; henceforth BM) develop
a tractable framework to study persuasion with multiple experts. They also present
an example where the decision-maker is better o¤ under a homogeneous rather than
a diverse panel. The current article attempts to uncover the key drivers behind the
optimal panel design and explores conditions under which each type of panel diverse
or homogeneous may be optimal.
In our model that closely follows BMs framework, a decision-maker has to choose
an action in the unit interval [0; 1]: The optimal decision from the decision-makers
point of view is denoted as the state of the world. Her objective is to minimize the loss
which is an increasing function of the decision error, i.e., the distance between the state
and the action. The decision-maker chooses her action based on the veriable reports
from the two experts. The experts have state-independent and monotonic preferences
over the decision-makers action. In particular, an experts preference is identied by
his agendaor most preferred action (which can be 0 or 1). Each expert is privately
informed of the state with a probability which we refer to as his quality.Expert types
(informed or uninformed) may be correlated. We assume that the information is hard
in the sense that the state cannot be incorrectly reported. An uninformed expert must
admit ignorance while an informed expert has the choice to either report the state or
to pretend to be uninformed. The decision-maker takes the action that maximizes her
expected payo¤, given her posterior belief about the state based on the reports from
the two experts.
In this framework, we ask the following question: If the decision-maker could choose
the experts (at the beginning of the game) based on their agendas, what factors drive
her choice and when is each type of panel diverse (experts with respective agendas 0
and 1) and homogeneous (both experts with the same agenda) likely to be optimal?
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The equilibrium in the disclosure game is characterized by the decision-makers de-
fault action, i.e., the action chosen endogenously when neither expert reveals the
state. Each informed expert chooses to reveal the state if doing so gives him a payo¤
higher than the default, but chooses to pool with the uninformed otherwise. Thus,
an expert with agenda 0 reports only those states that are smaller than the default
while the one with agenda 1 reports only the states that are larger than the default.
This characterization gives rise to a tradeo¤ between the diverse and the homogeneous
panels.
We illustrate this tradeo¤by comparing the diverse panel with the left-homogeneous
panel (where both experts have agenda 0). In the diverse panel, the experts jointly
cover the state space, and if both experts are informed, each state is reported by
exactly one of the two experts. Thus, each state is reported with a probability that is
equal to the quality of an expert. On the other hand, in the left-homogeneous panel,
each (informed) expert reports all states that are smaller than the default. Therefore,
ex-ante, each state left of the default is reported with the probability that at least
one of the two experts is informed, but the states higher than the default are never
reported. Moreover, the default action in the left-homogeneous panel is higher than
that in the diverse panel: If both experts in a left-homogeneous panel plead ignorance,
the decision-maker rationally places more weight on the expert(s) nding the state to
be adverse rather than both experts simultaneously failing to observe the state.
Hence, compared to a diverse panel, in a homogeneous panel the decision-maker
learns the state with a high probability if the state lies in a larger subset of the state
space, but the states outside this subset are never revealed. The homogeneous panel
is therefore more likely to be e¤ective if the corresponding default action is su¢ ciently
extreme (i.e., far enough from the common agenda of the two experts) implying that
the set of states over which revelation improves (over the diverse panel) is large enough.
The optimal panel is ascertained by comparing the observability and associated losses
over di¤erent parts of the state space, which, in turn, depend on the decision-makers
risk attitudes, the distribution of the state and the expertstypes, and the location of
the default actions (an equilibrium object in itself) under the two types of panels. We
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present two key results that highlight the role of these factors in driving the optimal
panel choice.
First, we show that (Proposition 2) there is a threshold of correlation between the
expertstypes above which the diverse panel is optimal and below which one of the two
homogeneous panels is optimal. The result follows from the simple observation that
with an increase in correlation, the value of having both experts report over the same
set of states goes down while the value of both reporting over di¤erent sets of states
remains una¤ected.
Recall that the correlation in expert types can be interpreted in terms of the degree
of similarity in the experts information sources. Thus, the above result indicates
in the optimal panel design there is a tension between the diversity in agenda and
diversity in information sources. However, it is worth noting that in reality, it is hard
to disentangle these two sources of diversity. An experts background and training
may not only shape his methodology and information sources he tends to access, but
are also likely to inuence his world-view.1 Therefore, when a homogeneous panel is
replaced by a diverse panel, we may have two kinds of change: a change from similar
to opposite preference or ideology, and a change from common to diverse information
sources. Our result shows that these two changes have opposite e¤ects on the relative
e¤ectiveness of a diverse panel.
Next, we study how the correlation threshold derived in Proposition 2 varies with
the model parameters. In particular, we seek conditions under which this threshold is
strictly positive as it informs us on optimal panel design in a natural benchmark case:
experts with independent types. We show that (Proposition 3) if the expert types are
independent, a homogeneous panel is optimal irrespective of the quality of experts if
the probability density of the state is log-concave and the decision-makers loss function
satises decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA).2 Notice that these conditions are
fairly standard in the sense that they are satised by a lot of environments commonly
1In the above example on environmental regulation, two industry lobbyists may use similar argu-
ments and tap into a similar set of networks for drawing their information; similarly, two environmental
scientists or activists would look at articles published in similar journals, and so on.
2Since the decision-makers payo¤ function is the negative of her loss function, the former exhibits
increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA) when the latter exhibits DARA.
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assumed in the literature, e.g., (truncated) normal or uniform density of the state and
quadratic losses.
To see the intuition, let us compare the diverse panel with the left-homogeneous
panel. Recall that the default action is higher in the latter panel. Now, the decision-
maker gains from a higher default action as: (i) it expands the set of states reported by
both experts and reduces the set of unreported states, and (ii) it reduces the decision
error arising in the unreported states above the default. But a higher default action also
increases potential decision errors that may occur if a very low state goes unreported
because both experts are uninformed.
The two conditions in Proposition 3 jointly strengthen the advantage and dampen the
disadvantage of a more extreme default action in a homogeneous panel. Log-concavity
of density precludes situations where the prior distribution is so concentrated around a
particular state that irrespective of the panel conguration, the default must lie close
to that state. Moreover, a log-concave density puts relatively less weight on extreme
states. Such thin-tailed density coupled with moderate risk aversion ensures that
the larger decision errors in a homogeneous panel remain relatively inexpensive.
While log-concavity of density and DARA loss function for the decision-maker are
jointly su¢ cient for the optimality of a homogeneous panel (with independent experts),
these conditions are not necessary. However, we provide examples to argue that if these
conditions are not met, the diverse panel can turn out to be optimal. We further show
that, under appropriate conditions, the homogeneous panel becomes less likely to be
optimal as the density function becomes less dispersed or the decision-maker becomes
more sensitive to large errors.
Finally, we explore the optimal panel design for an arbitrary level of positive cor-
relation.3 We show that under quadratic loss and log-concave and symmetric density,
a homogeneous panel is optimal for an intermediate range of quality and the diverse
panel is optimal otherwise (Proposition 4). This result follows from the observation
that in a homogeneous panel, the marginal value of the second expert with the same
3Trivially, under a negative correlation, the conditions in Proposition 3 continue to guarantee that
a homogeneous panel is optimal irrespective of the expertsquality.
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preference is rather modest if either the rst expert is already very likely to be informed
or the experts are of low quality to begin with.
Related literature: Some of the earliest contributions to the literature on persuasion
games, such as Milgrom (1981), Grossman (1981), and Milgrom and Roberts (1986),
argue that under veriable messages, if the expert is known to possess the relevant
information, in equilibrium, a skeptical decision-maker can extract all information.4
However, this result is sensitive to the assumptions about the experts information:
if there is a positive probability that the expert is uninformed, then an expert with
adverse information can hide such information in equilibrium by selective disclosure
(see, e.g., Dye, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1988; Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990; Shavell, 1994;
Shin, 1994).5 Our model makes extensive use of these ideas in the context of optimal
design of expert panels.
The literature on optimal composition of expert panels in the persuasion setting is
still nascent. Several authors have compared the e¢ cacy of a diverse expert panel
with a setting where only one expert (or the decision-maker herself) is responsible for
gathering and revealing all information. Such studies typically conclude in support
of using a diverse panel. For example, Shin (1998) compares a panel of two experts
with opposing interests to one unbiased expert, and shows that the former may reveal
more information. Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) make a similar comparison in a
model with costly information acquisition and monetary transfers. They show that the
use of opposing experts (or, advocacy) allows for sharper incentives for information
acquisition. More recently, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) present a general model
of persuasion games and identify conditions on the information environment under
4For an extension of this result to more general environments, see Seidmann and Winter (1997),
Mathis (2008), Hagenbach et al. (2014). The literature on unveriable messages with multiple senders
also presents a similar theme. It argues that if experts are known to be informed about the state, then
there is a fully revealing equilibrium for a wide range of parameters (Krishna and Morgan, 2001b;
Battaglini, 2002).
5Some other reasons that full disclosure may not take place in equilibrium are disclosure costs (Ver-
recchia, 1983), structure of provability (Dziuda, 2011), equivocal information (Perez-Richet, 2012),
and non-monotonicity of the experts preferences with respect to the decision-makers actions (Gio-
vannoni and Seidmann, 2007).
8 BHATTACHARYA, GOLTSMAN, AND MUKHERJEE
which competition (weakly) increases information revelation. They show that given
these conditions, if the expertspreference misalignment increases, it never reduces the
amount of information revealed in equilibrium (under the Blackwell informativeness
ordering).
A conclusion similar to ours is reached by Gerardi and Yariv (2008), who demonstrate
that the optimal panel comprises experts with identical extreme preferences in order to
provide the best incentives for costly information acquisition.6 A similar observation is
made by Kartik et al. (2016): under certain conditions the expertsinformation acqui-
sition decisions are strategic substitutes and the presence of other experts (like-minded
or opposed) may reduce an experts e¤ort in information gathering. Consequently, the
decision maker may prefer consulting just one (albeit biased) expert to using a panel
of (possibly) opposed experts.7
An intermediate position is occupied by Beniers and Swank (2004), who consider a
model where the experts can acquire both veriable and unveriable information, and,
unlike in our model, the experts have state-dependent preferences. They show that
the committee should consist of similar experts, whose preferences are close to those
of the decision-maker, if the cost of information acquisition is low, and of experts with
opposing extreme preferences, if the cost is high.
Notice that all the above studies argue for similar panels in terms of sharper incen-
tives for information acquisition. In contrast, we assume the availability of information
to be exogenous, and show that the relative e¢ ciency of similar panels may stem from
stronger incentives for information revelation.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model,
and the equilibrium of the persuasion game is characterized in Section 3. The question
of optimal panel design is explored in Section 4. Section 5 discusses some extensions
of our model, and the nal section draws a conclusion. Appendix A contains proofs
not provided in the main text, and appendix B contains some more results.
6For other instances of this result (i.e., increased diversity between senders leads to a less informative
outcome), see Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) and Newton (2014). However, the mechanisms driving
this result in these articles are very di¤erent from ours.
7Krishna and Morgan (2001a) and Cai (2009) also argue that increasing the committee size may
reduce the decision-makers payo¤.
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2. The Model
Our model closely follows the environment described in BM. Consider a decision-
maker who must take an action y 2 Y = [0; 1] based on the underlying state  2
 = [0; 1]. The decision-maker prefers to choose an action that minimizes her loss
v (jy   j); we will assume that v() is twice di¤erentiable, v(0) = v0(0) = 0 and
v0(z) > 0, v00(z) > 0 for z > 0. The decision-maker does not observe the state, which is
distributed according to the distribution function F (). We assume that the associated
probability density function f() exists and is continuous.
The decision-maker can solicit information from a panel of two experts, A and B.
Each expert can be of one of two types: informed or uninformed. An informed expert
observes the state perfectly, while the uninformed expert observes nothing. An experts
type is his private information. We assume that the probability of being informed, ,
is the same across the experts; i.e.,
 := Pr(expert A is informed) = Pr(expert B is informed);
and we refer to  as the quality of an expert.
We further assume that the expertstypes may be correlated. Formally, let  i 2
f0; 1g be the type of expert i, where  i = 1 if expert i is informed and 0 otherwise.
Further, denote Pr (A; B) = pAB : The distribution over the types can be dened in
terms of the marginal  and a measure of correlation between the types  := p11p00  
p10p01. In particular, we have:
p00 = (1  )2 + ; p11 = 2 + , and p10 = p01 = (1  )  :
Clearly, p11 + p10 = p11 + p01 = . To make sure that all probabilities are well-dened,
we will assume that  2 [0; 1], where 0 =  min f2; (1  )2g and 1 = (1  ).
As the following examples illustrate, the correlation among the experts types may
stem from the inherent nature of the available information sources as well as from the
nature of the expertsaccess to these information sources.
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Example 1 (Positive correlation due to nature of information access). Suppose that
there are N sources, each of which independently reveals the state with probability 1 p,
for some p 2 (0; 1). Suppose also that N = 2n + s; where expert A has private access
to the rst n sources, expert B has private access to the next n sources and both have
access to the nal s sources. Then p10 = p01 = pn+s(1  pn), p00 = p2n+s, and therefore
p11 = 1   p2n+s   2pn+s(1   pn). So  = p11p00   p10p01 = pN (1  ps);  = 0 if s = 0
(all sources are proprietary), and  > 0 if s 2 f1; : : : ; Ng; note that  is increasing in
the number of common sources s, the total number of sources N being xed.
Example 2 (Positive correlation due to nature of information source). The experts are
running their tests on the same data. The data can be amenable to testing (good)
with probability p 2 (0; 1), and bad with probability of 1   p. The data quality is
unknown to the experts. The testing technology is the same for both experts. If the
data is good, the probability that the test reveals the state is q 2 (0; 1). If the data
is bad, the test never reveals the state. Suppose that both experts are allowed to run
their tests, and the outcomes of the tests are statistically independent conditional on
data quality. Then p11 = pq2, p10 = p01 = pq(1   q), and p00 = 1   p + p(1   q)2, so
 = pq2(1  p) > 0.
Example 3 (Negative correlation due to exclusive access to information source). Sup-
pose again that there are N sources of information, and each expert has exclusive access
to N=2 sources. Exactly one of the sources is fruitful in that it potentially reveals the
state. The fruitful source reveals the state with probability 1 p; p 2 (0; 1). Each source
is equally likely to be fruitful ex ante. Now we have p00 = p, p10 = p01 = 12(1  p), and
p11 = 0. So  =  14(1  p)2 < 0.
Each expert i (i 2 fA;Bg) has a state-independent ideal action, or agenda, xi 2
f0; 1g, and his utility ui depends on his loss jy   xij : Since we only use the fact that
an experts utility function is strictly decreasing in the loss, we assume ui(jy   xij) =
  jy   xij. Without loss of generality, let us assume that xA  xB. The agendas are
commonly known. We will refer to an agenda prole (xA; xB) 2 f0; 1g  f0; 1g as a
panel. We will call the agenda prole (xA; xB) = (0; 1) the diverse panel, (xA; xB) =
(0; 0) the left-homogeneous panel, and (xA; xB) = (1; 1) the right-homogeneous panel.
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Before the decision-maker chooses her action, each expert sends a message mi (i 2
fA;Bg) to the decision-maker. The messages are assumed to be veriable. An unin-
formed expert must admit that he is uninformed, i.e., report mi = ;, but an informed
expert has the option of either revealing the true state or feigning ignorance and pool-
ing with the genuinely uninformed type; i.e., the message set for an informed expert in
state  is f; ;g. Given a prole of messages m = hmA;mBi ; the decision-maker takes
an action y(m) 2 [0; 1].
We use perfect Bayesian Equilibrium as the solution concept.8 Also, as F is nonatomic,
without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to pure strategies. The key focus of
our analysis is to characterize the panel (xA; xB) that minimizes the ex-ante loss of the
decision-maker (given  and ). In other words, we seek of characterize the decision-
makers panel choice if she could form the panel by choosing two experts based on their
publicly known agendas (keeping the probability distribution of expert types xed).
A few remarks about the model are in order. First, notice the key di¤erence between
our model and that of BM: While BM allows for any compact and convex state space
in Rn, it assumes that the expertstypes are independent. In contrast, we assume that
the state space is a bounded interval in R but allow for correlated types. As we will
discuss below, the correlation between types plays a salient role in our analysis, and
the assumption of unidimensional state space enables us to clearly dene the notion of
opposing agendas between experts.
Second, though we limit attention to experts with extremeagendas (as xi 2 f0; 1g),
for the analysis of the optimal panel design this assumption does not entail any loss
of generality. While a more general model could allow for moderate agendas (i.e.,
xi 2 [0; 1]), BM shows that the decision-makers ex-ante loss (in equilibrium) is always
minimized when the agendas of both experts are in f0; 1g.9
Finally, we could allow for a more general reporting strategy for the experts à la
Milgrom (1981): an informed expert may obfuscate his message by reporting a subset of
8Note that our assumption of veriable information on states implies that if an expert takes an
o¤-equilibrium action that reveals , the decision-makers o¤-equilibrium belief must be degenerate at
.
9While BM proves this result with independent expert types ( = 0), the proof extends straight-
forwardly  2 [0; 1] :
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the state space that contains the true state. Following Milgroms unravelling argument,
one can argue that whenever the experts have extreme agendas the set of equilibria
under such general reporting strategies exactly coincides with the set of equilibria in
our model. Hence, our analysis would remain unaltered even if we consider such a
broader class of reporting strategies.10
3. Equilibrium characterization
In this section, we briey state the key characteristics of the equilibrium of the
persuasion game for a given panel (xA; xB). The analysis below adapts the equilibrium
characterization discussed in BM to our setting and highlights the trade-o¤ associated
with the optimal panel choice.
Observe that if at least one expert reveals the state (i.e., if mi =  for some i 2
fA;Bg), then the decision-maker optimally chooses y(m) = . Thus, the decision-
makers strategy is completely characterized by her action y := y(;; ;) when neither
expert reports the state. We call y the decision-makers default action. On the other
hand, the strategy of each informed expert i is described by his revelation set i =
f 2  : mi = g; which is the set of states that he would report.
Also note that an informed expert is choice of message matters only when the other
expert does not report. Conditional on this event, expert i induces the action y =  by
disclosing the state, and the default action y = y by not disclosing. Thus, revealing
the state is a best response for informed expert i if and only if  2 i(y) = f 2  :
jy xij  j xijg.11 In particular, if xi = 0, then i(y) = [0; y], and if xi = 1, then
i(y
) = [y; 1].
Let us denote the equilibrium default action for the panel (xA; xB) by yxAxB . That
is,
10However, in this situation, panels with extreme experts may not be optimal. In particular, we
cannot rule out the existence of partially informative equilibria with non-extreme expert panels that
may lead to a higher payo¤ for the decision-maker than the extreme panels. Nevertheless, we are
unaware of the existence of such a case.
11Here we are focusing on equilibria where an expert always reveals the state whenever he is
indi¤erent between revealing and concealing. As F () is continuous, any alternative specication in
this regard would not change the decision-makers equilibrium payo¤.
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y01 = arg min
y2[0;1]
(1  )
Z y01
0
v (jy   j) dF () + (1  )
Z 1
y01
v (jy   j) dF ();
y00 = arg min
y2[0;1]
 
(1  )2 +  Z y00
0
v (jy   j) dF () +
Z 1
y00
v (jy   j) dF ();
y11 = arg min
y2[0;1]
Z y11
0
v (jy   j) dF () +  (1  )2 +  Z 1
y11
v (jy   j) dF ():
The associated rst-order conditions are given as:
(1)
R yxAxB
0 v
0  yxAxB    dF ()R 1
yxAxB
v0
 
   yxAxB

dF ()
=
8>>><>>>:
1 if (xA; xB) = (0; 1)
1= ((1  )2 + ) if (xA; xB) = (0; 0)
(1  )2 +  if (xA; xB) = (1; 1)
:
The strict concavity of v guarantees that the default action is unique under all panels.
Note that the default action in a diverse panel, y01, is independent of  and , and
it is identical to the action the decision-maker would take if none of the experts were
present. Two other salient characteristics of the equilibrium default action are given in
the proposition below (this result is based on propositions 2 and 4 in BM. We omit the
formal proof for sake of brevity as the subsequent discussion illustrates the argument).
As we will see later, these observations play a critical role in our subsequent analysis
of the optimal panel design.
Proposition 1. (a) For any  2 (0; 1) and  2 [0; 1], 0 < y11 < y01 < y00 < 1. (b)
For all three types of panels, the equilibria are outcome equivalent to the equilibria that
would emerge if the decision-maker could commit to a default action before receiving
the messages.12
12Here we assume that the decision-maker commits only to a default action, rather than to a
mechanism that maps the reports to a default action.
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The rst part of the proposition states that the equilibrium default actions under
the diverse and the two homogenous panels can be unambiguously ranked. Intuitively,
it reects the rational skepticism of the decision-maker (Milgrom, 1981) as she updates
her belief on the underlying state when the panel fails to reveal any information.
First, consider the intuition for y11 < y

00: Observe that in a right-homogeneous panel
(similarly, left-homogeneous panel), both informed experts reveal the state if and only
if is closer to 1 (similarly, closer to 0) than the default action. Thus, while updating her
belief, the decision-maker puts more weight on the low states in the absence of reports
from a (1; 1) panel than in the absence of reports from a (0; 0) panel. Conversely, the
decision-maker puts more weight on the high states in the absence of reports from
a (0; 0) panel than in absence of reports from a (1; 1) panel. Moreover, note that
y01 2 (y00; y11) as the absence of reports from a diverse panel can occur if either both
experts are uninformed or if only one expert is informed and the state is further away
from the agenda of the informed expert than the default action. Hence, the decision-
maker puts less weight on states that are too high (similarly, too low) relative to the
case of the (0; 0) panel (similarly, (1; 1) panel).
(a) Diverse panel:
t0 t1y01
Expert at 0 reveals
-
Expert at 1 reveals
-
(b) Homogeneous panel (both experts have agenda 0):
t0 t1y00
Both experts reveal
-
None reveals
-
Figure 1. The trade-o¤ between the diverse panel (one expert
at each end) and a homogeneous panel (both experts at 0)
This result also allows us to see the trade-o¤ between the diverse and the homo-
geneous panels. In the diverse panel, the two experts jointly coverthe entire state
OPTIMALITY OF DIVERSE EXPERT PANELS 15
space: the states below the default action are revealed by the expert with agenda 0,
and the states above by the expert with agenda 1. In a homogeneous panel, on the
other hand, the experts cover the same subset of the state space: for example, in
the left-homogeneous panel, both experts will reveal the state if it is below the default
action y00, but none will if it is above. Also, the default action would be further away
from agenda 0 than its diverse panel counterpart (i.e., y01 < y

00). The comparison
between the diverse and the right-homogeneous panel is similar.
Hence, compared to the diverse panel, in a homogeneous panel the decision-maker
learns the state with a greater probability if the state lies in a larger subset of the state
space, but the states outside this subset are never revealed. In other words, consulting
a diverse panel is similar to consulting a single expert of quality  who is unbiased:
if informed, he always reveals the state. In contrast, a homogeneous panel can be
conceived as a single expert with a relatively higher quality, 1  ((1  )2+), but one
who is biased: if informed, he reveals the state if and only if his agenda is closer to
the state than to the default action.13
This observation suggests that the optimal panel conguration will depend on the
decision-makers willingness to trade o¤ the observability of di¤erent parts of the state
space and the associated loss due to lack of report (see Figure 1). But such loss, in
turn, depends on her risk attitudes, the distribution of the state, and the location of
the default actions (an equilibrium object in itself) under the two types of panels. Our
analysis below attempts to clarify the role of these factors in driving the optimal panel
choice.
Part (b) of the above proposition implies that we can we can treat the equilibrium
default action as one that the decision-maker would choose to minimize her ex-ante
loss taking into account its impact on the experts revelation strategy. This result
directly follows from the observation that the rst-order conditions for the optimal
13We thank two anonymous referees for suggesting the aforementioned discussion on the intuition
for Proposition 1 as well as the interpretation of the trade-o¤ in terms of experts quality and bias.
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default action under commitment are identical to those in condition (1). As we will
see below, it vastly simplies our subsequent analysis of optimal panel design.14
4. Optimal panel design
Our rst result establishes that a diverse panel is optimal if and only if the correlation
between the expert types is above a threshold.
Proposition 2. For any  2 (0; 1), there exists  2 (0; 1) (depending on the loss
function v and the density of the state f) such that a homogeneous panel is optimal if
 <  and a diverse panel is optimal otherwise.
To see the intuition behind this result, let us examine how the decision-makers
expected loss from consulting a left-homogeneous panel and that from consulting a
diverse panel change with  (keeping  xed). As discussed earlier, a diverse panel can
be conceived as a single unbiasedexpert of quality ; whereas a left-homogeneous
panel is similar to consulting a single biasedexpert with a relatively higher quality,
1   ((1  )2 + ), who reveals the state if and only if it is below y00. When  = 1,
the quality di¤erence between these two experts disappears. In a homogeneous panel
the second expert becomes redundant since it cannot be the case that one expert is
informed when the other is not. Thus, the choice between the two panels boils down
to choosing between two experts of same quality () ; but in the case of homogeneous
panel the expert is biased whereas in case of diverse panel he is not. Clearly, diverse
panel becomes optimal.
As  decreases, the expected loss from consulting a diverse panel stays the same as
the two experts revelation sets are disjoint, the correlation in their types does not
a¤ect the decision-makers payo¤. The loss from a left-homogeneous panel, however,
decreases due to two e¤ects. First, there is a direct e¤ect: as  decreases, it increases the
probability of one expert knowing the state conditional on the other one not knowing;
14See Hart, et al. (forthcoming) and Sher (2011) for a more general treatment of equivalence
between commitment and equilibrium outcomes in persuasion games with a single expert. Ben-Porath,
et al. (2016) extend these results to multi-expert settings.
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this e¤ect makes the second expert with agenda 0 more valuable. Second, there is an
indirect e¤ect: the rst-order conditions (1) imply that as  decreases, y00 moves to
the right, making the two experts in a left-homogeneous panel cover a larger part of
the state space. A similar intuition applies in the comparison of the diverse and the
right-homogeneous panel. Hence, as  falls below a threshold, a homogeneous panel
becomes optimal.
Proposition 2 suggests that when the experts types are su¢ ciently likely to be
the same, then it is optimal to have experts with diverse agendas. This may be the
case when, for example, the experts mostly rely on the same sources. Note that this
case corresponds to the environments illustrated in Example 1 where the number of
common sources k is su¢ ciently large as well as in Example 2 where the experts are
running their independent investigations on the same data. If, on the other hand, the
experts are likely to rely on di¤erent information sources, then a homogeneous panel
is more likely to be the optimal design. This may be the case when, for example, the
experts are using di¤erent methods to nd out the state, only one of which can be
fruitful (this case closely corresponds to the environment illustrated in Example 3).
Thus, Proposition 2 highlights a tension between the two types of expertsdiversity
diversity in agendas and diversity in information sources and implies that seeking
diversity in both dimensions may be undesirable.
Notice that in our analysis the correlation between expertstypes is assumed to be
exogenous and invariant to the design of the panel. While it is conceivable that the
correlation in expert types can also change when we change the panel composition
(e.g., like-minded experts may use the same information sources whereas opposing
experts may use di¤erent ones), the exogeneity assumption helps us to tease out the
role of correlation between expert types on the e¤ectiveness of diverse and homogeneous
panels. Moreover, in many real-life settings the decision-maker faces a choice of panel
composition in terms of preferences, while the correlation in private information may
be determined by the institutional norms that are not predicated upon the design of
the panel.
For example, in many parliamentary and judicial settings, transparency laws or
norms force the members of a panel to share all their documents and information
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sources. Such sharing of documents then causes a high correlation in expert informa-
tion, with the level of correlation being determined by the nature of the question at
hand and the availability of documents. This holds true irrespective of whether we
consider the shared documents as discovered nal information or simply as data on
which each panel member runs his own inference. Importantly, such laws often exist
prior to the selection of the panel. When any committee is selected in presence of such
laws or norms, we can think of the problem of the decision-maker as deciding on the
preference composition of the panel with the correlation in types being already given.
We can also make the following observation on how the correlation in types a¤ects the
decision-makers equilibrium payo¤. Fix , and suppose that the decision-maker can
choose both  and (xA; xB). What value of  maximizes the decision-makers payo¤?
It is interesting to note that the decision-makers payo¤ is maximized when the types
are as negatively correlated as possible (i.e.,  = 0) and one of the homogeneous
panels is chosen.15 The argument is simple and a direct implication of the following
two observations: First, from Proposition 2 we know that a homogeneous panel must
be optimal for all  2 (0; ), and second, the loss from any homogeneous panel
monotonically increases in , while that of the diverse panel is independent of .
Next, we explore how  depends on the loss function v and the density of the
state f . In particular, we seek conditions on v and f under which  > 0, as the
conditions would inform us on the optimal panel conguration when the expert types
are statistically independent (i.e.,  = 0). Notice that the conditions on v and f for  to
be positive (negative) are exactly the conditions for the optimality of a homogeneous
(diverse) panel when  = 0. This analysis is important on its own merit. In many
settings, independent expert types is a plausible assumption; moreover, it also serves
as a benchmark as most of the extant literature on persuasion games maintains this
assumption (see, e.g., Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999; Shin, 1998).
Unfortunately, for generic v and f functions, conditions that are both necessary and
su¢ cient for the optimality of a given type of panel appear elusive. We rst develop a
15In a common value voting context, Ladha (1992) also concludes that negative or low correlation
among experts assessments improves decision-making.
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set of su¢ cient conditions (Proposition 3) for the optimality of a homogeneous panel
and then show that if these conditions are relaxed, the diverse panel could be optimal.
Proposition 3. If (i) f () is log-concave and strictly positive on its domain and (ii)
v00 (z) =v0 (z) is weakly decreasing, then  > 0 for any  2 (0; 1).
The main implication of the above result is that under the above conditions, a
homogeneous panel is optimal irrespective of expert quality whenever the expert types
are statistically independent (i.e., when  = 0). The intuition behind this result can
again be traced from the trade-o¤ between quality and bias that we have mentioned
earlier. Recall that a homogeneous panel can be conceived as single expert who is
of relatively high quality (i.e., observes the state with probability 1   (1  )2) but
biased. For example, under a left-homogeneous panel, the expert reveals the state
only if it is below y00. But the closer is y

00 to 1, the smaller is the bias. Also notice
that a homogeneous panel exposes the decision-maker to costlier errors e.g., when the
state is close to 0 and both experts are uninformed, a left-homogeneous panel leads to
a larger error than a diverse panel as y00 > y

01. Also, the states closer to 1 are never
revealed and necessarily lead to a loss. Thus, a homogeneous panel is more appealing
to the decision-maker when (i) the default action is more extreme (i.e., y00 is close to 1
and/or y11 is close to 0) leading to a smaller bias and (ii) the errors in decision-making,
jy   j, particularly when the state is closer to the extreme, are not too costly.
The conditions invoked in the above proposition guarantee these two features of the
decision-making process. The log-concavity of f implies that the distribution is not
too concentrated around any particular state and ensures that the default action under
homogeneous panel is su¢ ciently extreme. Log-concavity also ensures that the density
is thin-tailedin the sense that it does not put too much weight on the extreme states.
This condition, along with the decreasing v00=v0 condition, mutes the loss associated
with the decision-making errors. Note that v00=v0 is weakly decreasing means that
the decision-makers loss function exhibits weakly decreasing absolute risk aversion
(DARA); i.e., the loss function v may not increase too rapidly with the magnitude of
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the decision error. The thin-tailed density and moderate risk tolerance of the decision-
maker ensure that errors in decision-making when the state is towards the extreme are
not too costly for the decision-maker. Consequently, a homogeneous panel dominates
its diverse counterpart.16
We conclude this section with two remarks that further clarify the implications and
intuition of the above proposition. First, notice that the two conditions specied in
Proposition 3 are quite familiar in the extant literature. The DARA loss function is
commonly assumed (e.g., quadratic loss function) and so is log-concavity (e.g., normal
(including truncated normal) and uniform distribution have this property). Thus, our
nding suggests that when expertstypes are independent (i.e.,  = 0), having experts
with diverse agendas is suboptimal in a wide range of settings. This may be the case
if, for example, the experts rely on diverse proprietary sources. (Note that in terms of
the environment given in Example 1, this is the case when there is no common source,
i.e., k = 0.)
Second, notice that the two conditions in Proposition 3 are not individually su¢ -
cient; they must hold jointly to ensure the optimality of a homogeneous panel under
independent expert types if any one of these two conditions is relaxed, one can nd
parameters when the diverse panel becomes optimal even if  = 0. The following two
examples illustrate this point.
Example 4. Suppose that v(jy   j) = exp(10 (y   )2)   1, f is uniform,  = 0
and  = 1=2. Note that v00=v0 is not monotone; it decreases if jy   j < 0:224 and
increases otherwise. Under the homogeneous panel (0; 0), the equilibrium default action
is y00 = 0:5634, and the decision-makers expected loss is 1:07 (by symmetry, the loss
in the same for the panel (1; 1)). But under the diverse panel the default action is
y01 = 0:5, and the decision-makers expected loss reduces to 1:06.
16It is worthwhile to note that in the example presented in BM on the optimality of homogeneous
panel, they assume quadratic loss and uniform distribution of states, a specication that statises the
two conditions stated in Proposition 3.
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Example 5. Let v(jy   j) = (y   )2 and  is drawn from U [0; 1] with probability 1
4
and from U

1
2
  ; 1
2
+ 

with probability 3
4
, where 0 <  < 1
2
. That is, pdf f () is
given as:
f () =
8<: 14 + 38 if  2

1
2
  ; 1
2
+ 

1
4
otherwise
:
Also, suppose that  = 0 and  = 1=2: In this case, diverse panel is optimal if  < 0:135:
In other words, the diverse panel is optimal if the distribution is concentrated around
1=2, and the homogeneous panel is optimal otherwise.17
Example 4 considers a log-concave f but relaxes the DARA condition on v. Notice
that the large losses associated with large errors in decision-making tip the balance
in favor of the diverse panel. In contrast, Example 5 maintains decreasing v00=v0 but
relaxes the log-concavity condition on f . Here the distribution is highly concentrated
around the state which corresponds to the optimal default action y01 for the diverse
panel. Hence, a switch to a homogeneous panel may make the decision-maker worse o¤
because the default action does not move much from its diverse panel counterpart and
leads to large bias in reporting (e.g., in a (0; 0) panel the state is never revealed if it is
larger than y00  0:56). Such a situation can be precluded by having the distribution
su¢ ciently spread outon its support, which is ensured by the log-concavity of f .
This example also indicates that log-concavity is not necessary for the optimality of
homogeneous panel: such a panel is indeed optimal for all  > 0:135; even though the
density is not log-concave for any  2 (0; 1=2). As  increases, the concentration of
probability density around  = 1=2 decreases and, given the increased variance of the
distribution, the decision-makers loss increases under all types of panels. However,
the homogeneous panel may lead to a smaller loss. As the concentration around 1=2
decreases, the default action under a homogeneous panel moves further to the extreme,
lowering the loss associated with such a panel.18
17To simplify the computation, this example features a discontinuous f (), contrary to what we
assume elsewhere. However, a close enough continuous approximation to f dened here would deliver
an example with similar properties.
18In fact, we can show that when the loss function is quadratic, i.e., v(jy j) = (y )2; a condition
that is more general than the logconcavity of f is su¢ cient for the optimality of the homogeneous
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5. Discussion
In this section we present a few additional results that further illustrate how the
primitives of the model may inuence the optimal panel design. We also discuss the
robustness of our ndings to a few natural extensions of the models.
5.1. Further remarks on the optimal panel design. The intuition for Proposition
3 as discussed earlier naturally leads to the conjecture that the diverse panel is optimal
for a wider range of  (i.e.,  is lower) when large errors get costlier for the decision-
maker, or when the distribution of the states gets more concentrated around some state.
Unfortunately, a general comparative statics result of this nature appears elusive. The
problem loses tractability as a change in the distribution or the loss function a¤ects
 not only directly, but also indirectly through the default actions. However, we can
illustrate these e¤ects when we change the density function f or the loss function v in
certain specic ways and in somewhat more restrictive environments. We provide an
intuitive description of the two results below while the formal statements and proofs
are presented in Appendix B (as Proposition B1 and B2 respectively).
Assume that f is symmetric, implying that y01 = 0:5: Now, suppose we perturb
the loss function v(z) in such a way that it remains unchanged for errors z  0:5 but
the loss increases for errors larger than 0:5. With this change in the loss function,
the payo¤ from the diverse panel remains una¤ected but that from the homogeneous
panel goes down. Therefore, as the loss from large erros gets larger, the diverse panel
becomes more likely to be optimal (see Proposition B1).
Next, assume that v is quadratic and f is symmetric. Suppose we consider a per-
turbation of f that makes it less concentrated in the middle in the following way:
keeping f unchanged left of y11 and right of y

00; we decrease the conditional variance
of  in the range [y11; y

00]: This change does not a¤ect the default actions from either
panel, but the reduction in concentration of states near y01 = 0:5 reduces the payo¤
panel. (The condition is as follows: denote S(y) =
R y
0
R 
0
F (t)dtd and T (y) =
R 1
y
R 1

(1 F (t))dtd. If
S and T are log-concave, then a homogeneous panel is optimal for every  in (0; 1). The proof of this
result is very similar to that of Proposition 3.) Moreover, numerical calculations indicate that under
quadratic loss the homogeneous panel remains optimal even under several log-convex distributions
that are commonly used in the literature (e.g., Beta with appropriate parameters).
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to the diverse panel more than that of the homogeneous panel. On the other hand,
keeping f unchanged in the range [y11; y

00] while making it less concentrated at the
extremes (i.e., left of y11 and right of y

00) raises 
; making the diverse panel more
likely to be optimal (see Proposition B2).
One may also ask if Proposition 3 could be extended to characterize the optimal
panel for any given . Notice that if the correlation is negative ( < 0), under the
conditions given in Proposition 3 a homogeneous panel would be optimal for any .
The following proposition sheds light on the case of positive correlation ( > 0).
Proposition 4. Suppose that f is log-concave and symmetric, and v is quadratic.
Then  (as dened in Proposition 2) is non-negative and single-peaked in : there
exists  2 (0; 1) such that () is strictly increasing on (0; ) and strictly decreasing
on (; 1). Moreover,  ! 0 as  ! 0 or 1. Consequently, for any  > 0, either the
diverse panel is always optimal, or there exist cuto¤s  and  such that a homogeneous
panel is optimal when  2 (; ) and the diverse panel is optimal otherwise.
Observe that under the conditions specied in Proposition 4, for any positive , no
matter how small, the diverse panel will be optimal when  is small enough or large
enough. On the other hand, the homogeneous panel remains optimal for moderate
values of . The intuition is simple: The advantage of the homogeneous panel over
the diverse panel comes from the fact that there is a second expert who may observe
the state when the rst expert has not. Notice that when  is positive, the marginal
value of the second expert in a homogeneous panel in comparison to the diverse panel
is the lowest when when  is either large or small. For large , it is already very likely
that the rst expert has observed the state, so the second expert in the homogeneous
panel is useful with a very small probability. For small , it is very unlikely that the
rst expert has observed the state, so in the absence of correlation, it does not make
much of a di¤erence whether to form a homogeneous or a diverse panel; however, the
positive correlation between the experts drives the value of the homogeneous panel
down relative to the diverse panel. Therefore, the homogeneous panel is most e¤ective
for moderate values of . Moreover, a decrease in correlation enlarges the set of  for
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which the homogeneous panel is optimal (i.e., the interval (; ) decreases with ). For
large enough values of correlation, it is possible that the diverse panel becomes optimal
for all values of :
5.2. Experts with di¤erent qualities. In our model, we assume that the two experts
have the same quality (). While this assumption simplies the analysis, none of our
results actually depend on it. In contrast, suppose that the experts di¤er in their
quality levels: expert is quality is i, i 2 fA;Bg, and A 6= B. We can argue that
for any (A; B) 2 (0; 1)2, both Propositions 2 and 3 continue to hold.19
This observation has a couple of important implications. First, it indicates that even
if the panel consists of more than two experts, under conditions in Proposition 3 the
optimal panel conguration is one where all experts have the same agenda. Note that
from the decision-makers point of view, having n experts of qualities 1; : : : ; n with
the same agenda x is equivalent to having a single expert with agenda x and quality
1 Qni=1(1 i). Now, since Proposition 3 holds for all A and B, it tells us that any
panel where m0 experts have agenda 0 and m1 experts have agenda 1 can be improved
upon by having a homogeneous panel where all m0+m1 experts have the same agenda
(0 or 1; as the case might be).
Second, in some environments, it allows us to explore how the di¤erence in the
expertsquality may impact the optimal panel choice.
Proposition 5. Fix A and B: Suppose that f () is continuous and bounded away
from 0. When the experts types are independent ( = 0) ; a homogeneous panel is
optimal if either 1 A
1 B or
1 B
1 A is close enough to 0.
The proposition above indicates that under any continuous and strictly positive prior
distribution, a homogeneous panel is optimal if the experts su¢ ciently di¤er in their
level of informedness. To see the intuition behind this nding, consider the case where
A = 1 and B < 1. Let us x xA = 0 and compare the panels (0; 1) and (0; 0). With
either of these panels, full revelation will occur in equilibrium, because the default
19The proof is available from the authors upon request.
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action will equal 1, and expert A will reveal every realization of  (with the possible
exception of  = 1) with probability 1. Therefore, both panels will result in zero
expected loss for the decision-maker.
Now suppose that A decreases by a small amount. Regardless of xB, this has two
e¤ects on the decision-makers payo¤. First, with a decrease in A, the revelation set
for expert A shrinks as the default action decreases. This e¤ect decreases the decision-
makers payo¤. Second, even if the state lies in expert As revelation set, it is now
less likely to be revealed as expert A is now less likely to be informed. This e¤ect
also reduces the decision-makers payo¤. Now, as the loss is 0 when A = 1, the rst
e¤ect is of second-order and is dominated by the second e¤ect. While the second e¤ect
increases the loss, it is less pronounced under a homogeneous panel. This is due to the
fact that under a homogeneous panel the revelation set of expert A coincides with that
of expert B (i.e., the state lying in expert As revelation set would be revealed as long
as at least one of the two experts is informed). Therefore, a su¢ ciently small decrease
in A will make the homogeneous panel dominate the diverse panel.
5.3. Costly information and noisy signals. It is interesting to consider the impli-
cations of costly information acquisition in our model. Once we allow for the fact that
experts may have to spend costly e¤ort in acquiring information, some of our results
may change. Such considerations uncover an added benet of the diverse panel vis-
a-vis the homogeneous panel while the experts in a homogeneous panel su¤er from
free-riding concerns, there is no free riding in a diverse panel as the experts report
over a disjoint set of states. However, once we account for these concerns, we may
have multiple equilibria even with extreme panels. While a complete analysis of this
issue is beyond the scope of this article, our preliminary analysis indicates that not
only multiple equilibria may arise in such a setting, but also we cannot rule out the
possibility that a non-extreme panel may be optimal.20 Moreover, the ndings appear
to be very sensitive to the properties of the utility functions of the experts (e.g., risk
aversion), which have played little role in the current article. Nevertheless, the key
20We extended our model by assuming binary e¤ort, absolute loss function for experts, and qua-
dratic loss function for decision-maker.
26 BHATTACHARYA, GOLTSMAN, AND MUKHERJEE
trade-o¤ with panel choice that we highlight here continues to play an important role
even in such a complex environment.
Another interesting question is whether the nding of the model are robust to as-
suming that each expert observes a noisy signal of the state, not the state itself. Un-
fortunately, we were unable to produce a tractable extension of the model to this case
that would produce sensible results.21 However, we were able to analyze the equilibria
of a simplied model, where the state is binary (0 or 1), and each expert observes the
correct state with probability p > 0:5, and the wrong state otherwise. The experts
signals are independent conditional on the state. In the noiseless version of this model
(with p = 1), Proposition 2 holds, and the conclusion of Proposition 3 holds as long
as the decision-makers loss function is log-concave (i.e., under weaker conditions than
those of Proposition 3). Moreover, for any given panel conguration and for all values
of  and , the decision-makers payo¤ is continuous in p at p = 1. This implies that
for any given (; )-pair, there exists a threshold level of noise such that the payo¤
comparison between the di¤erent panel congurations is the same as in the noiseless
model, as long as the amount of noise is below the threshold. (In particular, for any
, the conclusion of Proposition 3 holds as long as the decision-makers loss function
is log-concave and the noise is small enough.) In this sense, the model is robust to the
introduction of a small amount of noise. We were not able to formally prove an analog
of Proposition 2 for the model with noise. However, our numerical analysis for the case
when the decision-makers loss function is quadratic indicates that the conclusion of
Proposition 2 continues to hold.
6. Conclusion
In a persuasion game involving self-interested experts, common intuition suggests
that seeking information from a panel of experts with diverse set of agendas leads to
better decision-making. The experts with competing interests may restrict each others
ability to manipulate information as one experts unfavorable information may be
21For example, in the formulation where the expertspayo¤ functions are linear and each expert
observes the the true state with a positive probability, and a draw from a continuous distribution on
[0; 1] otherwise, the setting with a homogeneous panel may fail to possess a symmetric Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium in cuto¤ strategies.
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favorable to the other, the formers incentive to conceal information is muted by the
latters incentive to divulge the truth. In this article, we argue that the issue of optimal
panel design is considerably more nuanced. In particular, we nd that a diverse panel
is optimal if and only if the correlation between the expertstypes is above a threshold.
Moreover, when the expertstypes are independent, under a wide set of environments
the decision-maker is better o¤ by consulting a homogeneous panel i.e., one where
the experts have identical and extreme preferences (prefer the highest or lowest action
possible).
One may argue that the correlation in the expertsdegree of informednessmay
depend on whether the experts rely on a common information source or whether there
are multiple information sources and each expert has exclusive access to a specic
source. Therefore, our ndings suggest that the optimality of diverse agendas should
be evaluated in conjunction with the diversity in information sources. In the presence of
a large diversity in the expertsinformation sources, diversity in the expertspreferences
is generally sub-optimal; and when there is a lack of diversity in information sources,
it is indeed optimal to have experts with diverse preferences.
Appendix
Appendix A. This appendix contains the proofs omitted in the text.
Proof of Proposition 2. Step 1. Given a default action y 2 [0; 1], let L(y) and R(y)
denote the expected loss from states to the left and right of y, respectively:
(2) L (y) =
Z y
0
v(jy   j)dF () and R (y) =
Z 1
y
v(jy   j)dF ();
Also, let VxAxB() be the expected decision-makers equilibrium loss when the panel is
(xA; xB). Then part (b) of Proposition 1 implies that
(3)
V01 () = miny2[0;1] (1  )L (y) + (1  )R (y) ;
V00 () = miny2[0;1]

(1  )2 + L (y) +R (y) ;
V11 () = miny2[0;1] L (y) +

(1  )2 + R (y) :
Step 2. Note that as v ()  0, V00() and V11() are increasing in  by the Envelope
Theorem, whereas V01() is independent of . When  = 1, then (1  )2+ = 1 .
This implies that V01(1) < min fV00(1); V11(1)g.
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Step 3. The last step is to show that V01(0) > min fV00(0); V11(0)g. (The
existence of  would then follow by continuity). Indeed, if  2 [0:5; 1), then 0 =
 (1   )2, so V00(0) = V11(0) = 0 < V01(0). If  2 [0; 0:5); then 0 =  2; and
(1  )2 + 0 = 1  2: In this case,
V01 (0)  V00(0)
= [(1  )L(y01) + (1  )R(y01)]  [(1  2)L(y00) +R(y00)]
> [(1  )L(y01) + (1  )R(y01)]  [(1  2)L(y01) +R(y01)]
=  [L(y01) R(y01)] :
Thus, if L(y01)  R(y01); then V01 (0) > V00(0): If on the other hand, L(y01) < R(y01);
then by the same method we can show that V01 (0) > V11(0): Therefore, V01(0) >
min fV00(0); V11(0)g.
Proof of Proposition 3. We show that the stated conditions are su¢ cient for a ho-
mogeneous panel to be optimal for all  when  = 0. Hence, by Proposition 2 it follows
that under the same conditions  > 0 for all . The proof is given in the following
steps:
Step 1. Let VxAxB := VxAxB(0);where VxAxB() is given by equation (3). For t > 0,
let
(4)
g(t) = miny2[0;1] 1t (1  )2
R y
0
v(jy   j)dF + t R 1
y
v(jy   j)dF
= miny2[0;1] 1t (1  )2L (y) + tR (y) :
Then V11 = g((1   )2), V01 = g(1   ), and V00 = g(1). So, given , a homogeneous
panel is optimal if and only if
(5) min

g
 
(1  )2 ; g(1)	  g (1  ) :
Condition (5) holds for every  2 (0; 1) if g(t) is quasi-concave on (0; 1]. Therefore, it
is enough to prove that for any  2 (0; 1), either: (a) g0(t)  0 for all t 2 (0; 1); or (b)
g0(t)  0 for all t 2 (0; 1); or (c) there exists t 2 (0; 1) such that g0(t)  0 for t < t
and g0(t)  0 for t > t.
Step 2. For any  2 (0; 1), let y(t) = arg miny2[0;1] g(t) be dened by the rst-order
conditions
(6)
1
t
(1  )2L0 (y(t)) + tR0 (y(t)) = 0:
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By the Envelope Theorem,
(7) g0(t) =   1
t2
(1  )2L (y(t)) +R (y(t)) :
Hence, combining (6) and (7) we have:
(8) g0(t) R 0, `(y(t)) R r(y(t));
where for y 2 (0; 1],
(9) `(y) :=
R y
0
v0(y   )dFR y
0
v(y   )dF and r(y) :=
R 1
y
v0(   y)dFR 1
y
v(   y)dF :
Step 3. Since L00(y) > 0 and R00(y) > 0 by the convexity of v, the implicit function
theorem applies, and the function y(t) dened by (6) is di¤erentiable. It is strictly
increasing, because
dy(t)
dt
=
t 2(1  )2L0 (y(t)) R0 (y(t))
t 1(1  )2L00 (y(t)) + tR00 (y(t)) > 0:
Equation (6) implies that limt!0 y(t) = 0, limt!+1 y(t) = 1. Therefore, to prove
the quasi-concavity of g(t), it is enough to show that either (a) for all y 2 (0; 1),
` (y)  r (y), or (b) for all y 2 (0; 1), ` (y)  r (y), or (c) there exists y 2 (0; 1) such
that ` (y)  r (y) if y < y and ` (y)  r (y) if y > y. But to prove this, it is su¢ cient
to show that `(y) is decreasing and r(y) is increasing on (0; 1). Indeed, if this is true and
limy!0 `(y)  r(0), then case (b) holds; if limy!0 `(y) > r(0) and `(1)  limy!1 r(y),
then case (a) holds; nally, if limy!0 `(y) > r(0) and `(1) < limy!1 r(y), then case (c)
holds.
Step 4a. Consider `(y) rst:
`0(y) = d
dy
hR y
0 v
0(y )dFR y
0 v(y )dF
i
= 1
(
R y
0 v(y )dF)
2
hR y
0
v00(y   )dF R y
0
v(y   )dF    R y
0
v0(y   )dF2i
= 1
(
R y
0 v(y )dF)
2
hR y
0
v00(y   )dF R y
0
v0(y   )F ()
f()
dF
  R y
0
v0(y   )dF R y
0
v00(y   )F ()
f()
dF
i
:
The numerator isR y
0
v00(y   )dF R y
0
v0(y   )F ()
f()
dF   R y
0
v0(y   )dF R y
0
v00(y   )F ()
f()
dF =R y
0
v00(y   )dF R y
0
v00(y   ) v0(y )
v00(y )
F ()
f()
dF   R y
0
v00(y   ) v0(y )
v00(y )dFR y
0
v00(y   )F ()
f()
dF:
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Dividing the above by
 R y
0
v00(y   )dF2, which is positive, results in
(10)
R y
0
v0(y )
v00(y )
F ()
f()
v00(y )R y
0 v
00(y 0)dF (0)dF  
R y
0
v0(y )
v00(y )
v00(y )R y
0 v
00(y 0)dF (0)dFR y
0
F ()
f()
v00(y )R y
0 v
00(y 0)dF (0)dF:
For x 2 [0; 1], let
H(x) =
Z x
0
v00(jy   j)R 1
0
v00(jy   0j)dF (0)dF ():
The fact that v00 > 0 everywhere except possibly at 0 implies that H(x) is a cumulative
distribution function of a probability distribution on [0; 1] with density
h(x) =
v00(jy   xj)f(x)R 1
0
v00(jy   0j)dF (0) :
Now, expression (10) can be rewritten as
1
H(y)
R y
0
v0(y )
v00(y )
F ()
f()
dH   1
H(y)
R y
0
v0(y )
v00(y )dH  1H(y)
R y
0
F ()
f()
dH =
EH
h
v0(y )
v00(y )
F ()
f()
   yi  EH h v0(y )v00(y )    yiEH h F ()f()    yi  0;
as v
0(y )
v00(y ) is positive and decreasing in , and
F ()
f()
is increasing in  (since f is log-
concave). Therefore `0(y)  0.
Step 4b. Consider r(y) now:
r0(y) = d
dy
R 1
y v
0( y)dFR 1
y v( y)dF

= 1
(
R 1
y v( y)dF)
2

  R 1
y
v00(   y)dF R 1
y
v(   y)dF +
R 1
y
v0(   y)dF
2
= 1
(
R 1
y v( y)dF)
2
h
  R 1
y
v00(   y)dF R 1
y
v0(   y)1 F ()
f()
dF
+
R 1
y
v0(   y)dF R 1
y
v00(   y)1 F ()
f()
dF
i
:
Similarly to the calculations above, r0(y) has the same sign as
  R 1
y
v0( y)
v00( y)
1 F ()
f()
v00( y)R 1
y v
00(0 y)dF (0)dF +
R 1
y
v0( y)
v00( y)
v00( y)R 1
y v
00(0 y)dF (0)dFR 1
y
1 F ()
f()
v00( y)R 1
y v
00(0 y)dF (0)dF
=  EH
h
v0( y)
v00( y)
1 F ()
f()
   yi+ EH h v0( y)v00( y)   yiEH h 1 F ()f()    yi  0;
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as v
0( y)
v00( y) is positive and increasing in , and
1 F ()
f()
is decreasing in  (since f is
log-concave). Therefore r0(y)  0.
Proof of Proposition 4. Step 1. The fact that lim!0 () = lim!1 () = 0
follows from the condition that () 2 [ min f2; (1  )2g ; (1 )]. The fact that
  0 follows from Proposition 3.
Step 2. Let us now prove that () is single-peaked. The fact that f is symmetric
implies that for any  and , V00 = V11 and y01 =
1
2
.
Let 01 = (1 ) 1V01 = L(y01)+R(y01) (note that 01 does not depend on ), and let
y() = y00(; 
()). Also, for brevity, let us write L := L(y()), L0 := d
dy
L(y()),
and L00 := d
2
dy2
L(y()), and similarly for R. We know that ((); y()) jointly satisfy
((1  )2 + )L+R = (1  )01; ((1  )2 + )L0 +R0 = 0:
Now, di¤erentiating this system of equations one obtains:
d
d
= 2(1  )  01
L
;
dy
d
=
01L
0
LD ;
where D = ((1   )2 + )L00 + R00. We want to show that () has a unique global
maximum on [0,1].
Step 3. The fact that lim!0 () = lim!1 () = 0 and ()  0 implies
that either () is identically equal to zero, or is non-monotonic. In either case, there
exists an  2 (0; 1) such that d
d
() = 0.
It remains to be proved that such an  is unique. (Because lim!0 () =
lim!1 () = 0, ()  0, and  is continuously di¤erentiable, this will imply
that () is strictly increasing on (0; ) and strictly decreasing on (; 1)).
Step 4. Note that d
d
() = 0 i¤ (1   )L(y()) = 1
2
01; i.e., if we denote
G() := (1 )L(y()), then G() = G(0). To show that such an  is unique, it is
enough to show that G() is strictly concave.
Now,
G0() =  L+ 01(1  )(L
0)2
LD ;
and
G00() =   (L0)201
LD +
01
L2D2
  (L0)2 + 2(1  ) (L0)2 L00 01
LD
	
LD
 (1  ) (L0)2 01
n
(L0)2
L
+ L
0
D
dD
dy
  L00
oi
:
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Dividing G00() by (L
0)201
LD > 0 we see that G
00 < 0 i¤:
 1 + 1
LD
h
LD  1 + 2(1  )L00 01
LD
	  (1  )01 n (L0)2L + L0D dDdy   L00oi
=  2 + (1  )01
LD
h
2L00   (L0)2
L
  L0D dDdy + L00
i
< 0:
Since v is quadratic, L000 = R000 = 0. So, dD
dy
= ((1  )2 + )L000 +R000 = 0, and hence,
it is enough to establish the following two inequalities:
(a) (1  )01L
00
LD < 1; and (b) L
00 <
(L0)2
L
:
Step 5. Using the fact that (1  )01 = ((1  )2 + )L+R, inequality (a) reduces
to:
[((1  )2 + )L+R]L00 < ((1  )2 + )L00 +R00L, L00=L < R00=R:
This inequality follows from the fact that R(1 y)  L(y) (as f is symmetric), y() 
1
2
, and L
00
L
= L
00
L0  L
0
L
is decreasing (the proof that L0=L is decreasing can be found in
the proof of Proposition 3; the proof that L00=L0 is decreasing is identical). Inequality
(b) simply requires L00=L0 < L0=L; which follows from the fact that L0=L decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 5. Step 1. First, let us extend the technique behind the
proof of steps 1 and 2 of the proof of Proposition 3 to the case where A 6= B. This
will give us a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a homogeneous panel to be optimal
for a given pair (A; B).
Let
~g(t) = min
y2[0;1]
1
t
(1  A)(1  B)L (y) + tR (y) :
Then the decision-makers loss with the panel (xA; xB), ~VxAxB , is given by ~V11 =
~g((1   A)(1   B)), ~V01 = ~g(1   B), ~V10 = ~g(1   A), and ~V00 = ~g(1). There-
fore, a homogeneous panel is optimal if and only if min f~g((1  A)(1  B)); ~g(1)g 
min f~g(1  A); ~g(1  B)g.
Let ~y(t) = arg miny2[0;1] ~g(t) be dened by the rst-order conditions
1
t
(1  A)(1  B)L0 (~y(t)) + tR0 (~y(t)) = 0:
Then the default action with the panel (xA; xB), ~yxAxB , is given by ~y

11 = ~y
((1  
A)(1 B)), ~y01 = ~y(1 B), ~y10 = ~y(1 A), and ~y00 = ~y(1). It is easy to extend
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the proof of Proposition 3 to show that ~g0 (t) R 0 , ` (~y(t)) R r (~y(t)), where `(y)
and r(y) are dened by equation (9).
Step 2. Let us now examine the properties of the functions `(y) and r(y) when y is
close enough to 0 or 1. This step will show that if ~y11 and ~y

10 are small enough, and ~y00
and ~y01 are large enough, then ~V11 < ~V10 and ~V00 < ~V01, meaning that a homogeneous
panel is optimal.
Integrating by parts the numerator and the denominator of `(y) and using the fact
that v0(0) = 0 one obtains:
lim
y!0
1
`(y)
= lim
y!0
R y
0
v0(y   )F ()dR y
0
v0(y   )f()d  limy!0
maxx2[0;y] F (x)
R y
0
v0(y   )d
minx2[0;y] f(x)
R y
0
v0(y   )d = 0;
since f(y) is bounded away from zero. Since `(y) > 0, this implies that limy!0 1=`(y) =
0, and limy!0 `(y) = +1. However,
r(0) =
R 1
0
v0(y   )dFR 1
0
v(y   )dF <1:
Therefore, there exists "1 > 0 such that if ~y(t) < "1, then ` (~y(t)) > r (~y(t)),
and ~g0(t) > 0. Convexity of v implies that ~y(t) is strictly increasing. So if ~y11 =
~y ((1  A)(1  B)) < ~y10 = ~y(1   A) < "1, then ~y(t) < "1 for t 2 [(1   A)(1  
B); 1   A] and therefore ~g(t) is increasing on this interval. This means that ~V11 =
~g ((1  A)(1  B)) < ~g(1  A) = ~V10.
Similarly, limy!1 r(y) = +1 and r(1) < 1. This implies that there exists "2 > 0
such that if ~y(t) > 1 "2, then ~g0(t) < 0. So if ~y00 = ~y(1) > ~y01 = ~y(1 B) > 1 "2,
then ~y(t) > 1  "2 for t 2 [1  B; 1] and therefore ~g(t) is decreasing on this interval.
This means that ~V00 = ~g(1) < ~g(1  B) = ~V01.
Step 3. In this step, we will show that by driving max
n
(1  A)(1  B); 1 A1 B
o
to 0 , we can make ~y11 and ~y

10 arbitrarily close to 0, and ~y00 and ~y01 arbitrarily close
to 1.
Let " = min f"1; "2g. It remains to show that there exists  > 0 such that if
max

(1  A)(1  B); 1  A
1  B

< ;
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then ~y11 < ~y

10 < " and 1  " < ~y01 < ~y00. For  > 0, let
y0() = arg min
y2[0;1]

Z y
0
v(y   )dF +
Z 1
y
v(   y)dF;
y1() = arg min
y2[0;1]
Z y
0
v(y   )dF + 
Z 1
y
v(   y)dF:
The rst-order conditions for y0() and y1() are

Z y0()
0
v0(y0()  )dF =
Z 1
y0()
v0(   y0())dF;Z y1()
0
v0(y1()  )dF = 
Z 1
y1()
v0(   y1())dF:
These conditions imply that lim!0 y0() = 1, lim!0 y1() = 0.
For any A; B 2 (0; 1), note that ~y00 = y0((1   A)(1   B)), ~y01 = y0

1 A
1 B

,
~y10 = y1

1 A
1 B

, and ~y11 = y1 ((1  A)(1  B)). It is straightforward to extend
Proposition 1 to show that for any A; B 2 (0; 1), ~y11 < ~y10 and ~y01 < ~y00. Therefore,
for any " > 0, there exists  > 0 such that if max
n
(1  A)(1  B); 1 A1 B
o
< , then
~y11 < ~y

10 < " and 1  " < ~y01 < ~y00.
Appendix B. In this appendix, we present two propositions formalizing how changes
in the loss function v and density f a¤ect panel choice.
Proposition B1. Let f be symmetric and consider a class of loss functions v(x; ) :
R+ ! R+ (where   is an open, convex subset of R) that are di¤erentiable in (x; ),
strictly increasing and convex in x, and such that v(0; ) = v0(0; ) = 0. Suppose that
if 0 < 1, then v(x; 0) = v(x; 1) for x 2 [0; 0:5] and v(x; 0) < v(x; 1) for x > 0:5.
Then  is decreasing in . That is, as the loss from errors that are larger than 1=2
gets larger, the diverse panel becomes more likely to be optimal.
Proof. Let () be the value of  (as dened by Proposition 2) that corresponds to
v(x; ), and let y() be the value of y00 that corresponds to v(x; ) and  = 
().
Then (y(); ()) satisfy:
(11)
((1  )2 + ) R y
0
v(y   ; )dF + R 1
y v(   y; )dF = V01;
((1  )2 + ) R y
0
v0(y   ; )dF   R 1
y v
0(   y; )dF = 0;
where v0 is the partial derivative of v with respect to the rst variable.
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Di¤erentiating the rst equation of (11) with respect to  and making use of the
second equation, we obtain
(12)
@
@
h
((1  )2 + ) R y
0
v(y   ; )dF + R 1
y v(   y; )dF   V01
i
+ @
@
h
((1  )2 + ) R y
0
v(y   ; )dF + R 1
y v(   y; )dF   V01
i
d
d
= 0:
Therefore,
sign
d
d
=  sign @
@

((1  )2 + )
Z y
0
v(y   ; )dF +
Z 1
y
v(   y; )dF   V01

:
Using the second equation of (11) again, we obtain
@
@
h
((1  )2 + ) R y
0
v(y   ; )dF + R 1
y v(   y; )dF   V01
i
=  @V01
@
+ @
@
hR 1
y v(   y; )dF
i
+ @
@
hR y
0
v(y   ; )dF
i R 1
y v
0( y;)dFR y
0 v
0(y ;)dF > 0:
The inequality uses the facts that by the symmetry of f , V01 = 2
R 1=2
0
v(1=2  ; )dF ,
and therefore @V01
@
= 0; also (since y  1=2), @
@
hR 1
y v(   y; )dF
i
= 0; and
@
@
hR y
0
v(y   ; )dF
i
> 0. Therefore, d

d
< 0.
Proposition B2. Suppose that v is quadratic and consider a class of pdfs f(;') :
[0; 1]   ! [0; 1] (where  is an open, convex subset of R) that are symmetric and
di¤erentiable in  (the parameter ' measures the concentration of f , in the sense
dened below). Fix  2 (0; 1) and consider two values of ', '0 and '1. Let y :=
y00 (; '0) be the default action with the left-homogeneous panel given  and '0. Now,
the following claims hold:
(i) Suppose that f(;'0) = f(;'1) for  2 [0; 1 y)[(y; 1], and V0( j [1 y; y]) <
V1( j [1   y; y]) where V0 and V1 represent the variance of  under f(;'0) and
f(;'1) respectively (under these conditions y
 := y00 (; '0) = y

00 (; '1)). Then, if
the homogeneous panel is optimal under f(;'0), it is also optimal under f(;'1).
That is, keeping the distribution the same at the ends and making it less concentrated
in the middle makes the homogeneous panel more likely to be optimal.
(ii) Suppose that f(;'0) = f(;'1) for  2 [1   y; y], and V0( j [0; 1   y]) <
V1( j [0; 1   y]) (therefore, V0( j [y; 1]) < V1( j [y; 1])). Suppose also that
E0( j [0; 1   y]) = E1( j [0; 1   y]), where E0 and E1 represent the mean of 
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under f(;'0) and f(;'1) respectively (therefore, E0( j [y; 1]) = E1( j [y; 1]);
under these conditions y := y00 (; '0) = y

00 (; '1)). Then, if the diverse panel is
optimal under f(;'0), it is also optimal under f(;'1). That is, keeping the distrib-
ution unchanged in the middle and making it less concentrated at the ends makes the
diverse panel more likely to be optimal.
Proof. For a given ' 2 f'0; '1g, consider the di¤erence in losses between the left-
homogeneous and the diverse panels:
(V00   V01)(') = ((1  )2 + )
R y
0
(y   )2dF (;')
+
R 1
y(   y)2dF (;')  (1  )
R 1
0
(0:5  )2dF (;')
= ((1  )2 + )
hR y
0
2dF (;')  2y R y
0
dF (;') + (y)2F (y;')
i
+
R 1
y 
2dF (;')  2y R 1
y dF (;') + (1  F (y;'))(y)2
 (1  )
hR 1
0
2dF (;')  1
4
i
:
(Here y = y00(; '0) = y

00(; '1):) Let  = (V00   V01) ('1)  (V00   V01) ('0).
Proof of statement (i): Under the assumptions stated in part (i),
R 1
y 
2dF (;'0) =R 1
y 
2dF (;'1),
R 1
y dF (;'0) =
R 1
y dF (;'1). Since by the symmetry of f , we have
to have
R 1
0
dF = 0:5, the latter implies that
R y
0
dF (;'0) =
R y
0
dF (;'1). There-
fore,
 = ((1  )2 + )
hR y
0
2dF (;'1) 
R y
0
2dF (;'0)
i
 (1  )
hR 1
0
2dF (;'1) 
R 1
0
2dF (;'0)
i
= ((1  )2 +   (1  ))
hR y
0
2dF (;'1) 
R y
0
2dF (;'0)
i
< 0:
So if (V00   V01) ('0) < 0, then (V00   V01) ('1) < 0.
Proof of statement (ii): Under the assumption stated in part (ii),
R y
1 y dF (;'0) =R y
1 y dF (;'1),
R y
1 y 
2dF (;'0) =
R y
1 y 
2dF (;'1). We have assumed thatZ 1 y
0
dF (;'0) =
Z 1 y
0
dF (;'1);
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since f is symmetric and we have to have
R 1
0
dF = 0:5, this implies that
R y
0
dF (;'0) =R y
0
dF (;'1). Therefore,
 = ((1  )2 + )
hR 1 y
0
2dF (;'1) 
R 1 y
0
2dF (;'0)
i
+
R 1
y 
2dF (;'1) 
R 1
y 
2dF (;'0)
 (1  )
hR 1 y
0
2dF (;'1) +
R 1
y 
2dF (;'1)  R 1 y
0
2dF (;'0) 
R 1
y 
2dF (;'0)
i
= ((1  )2 +   (1  ))
hR 1 y
0
2dF (;'1) 
R 1 y
0
2dF (;'0)
i
+(1  (1  ))
hR 1
y 
2dF (;'1) 
R 1
y 
2dF (;'0)
i
> 0:
So if (V00   V01) ('0) > 0, then (V00   V01) ('1) > 0.
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